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ONE FOOT IN, ONE FOOT OUT:
THE POLITICAL THICKET
The venturings of the federal judiciary into the "political arena"
have been, at best, a difficult course to chart. Cousins v. City Council'
was yet another attempt by a lower federal court to apply the stand-
ards set out by the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiffs in Cousins
alleged that the redrawing of the aldermanic ward lines in Chicago2
was a gerrymander, working an invidious discrimination upon the
black, Puerto Rican and independent voters of the city. The black
voters claimed that the redistricting concentrated their voting strength
in the ghetto wards in such a way that they became a minority in the
fringe wards.3 Puerto Rican plaintiffs claimed that the ward lines
were drawn in such a manner as to fragment their ghetto into three
separate wards, none of which had a Puerto Rican majority.4 The in-
dependent voters also alleged a similar gerrymander.,
The district court had held that the independent voters did not
have standing to sue,6 and that they had failed to prove any sub-
stantive injury.7 As to the claims of the black and Puerto Rican
plaintiffs, the district court reached the merits and held that the
ordinance reapportioning the wards did not violate either the four.
teenth or the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution.8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of the claims advanced by the independent voters, based
not upon standing or failure to prove a substantive injury, but upon
1. 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972).
2. The city of Chicago is divided into 50 wards each represented by an alder-
man who sits on the City Council and has one vote. 466 F.2d at 831.
3. Id. at 834.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Cousins v. City Council, 322 F. Supp. 428, 435 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
7. Id. The district court stated as a "Conclusion of Law" that "the issue of
political gerrymandering ...is non-justiciable." Yet the court chose to base its
decree, dismissing the complaint of the Independent Voters of Illinois and the
Committee for an Effective City Council, upon lack of standing and failure to
prove substantive injury. Id. at 434, 435.
8. Id. at 436.
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the ground that the claims presented a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion.9 The court of appeals disagreed with the conclusions drawn
by the district court in regard to the assertions of the black and
Puerto Rican plaintiffs, and remanded the case for a fuller adjudica-
tion of the merits.1 0 Court of appeals Judge Stevens entered a dissent,
concluding that the claims of the independent voters were justici-
able;- but that on the merits all three groups (independents, blacks
and Puerto Ricans) had failed to prove their allegations.1 2
The Supreme Court's first affirmative plunge into the "political
arena" came in 1960 with Gomillion v. Lightfoot.- The Court held
that the denial of the voting rights of the black petitioners had
violated the fifteenth amendment."1 Justice Whrhittaker filed a separate
concurrence in which he said: "It seems to me that the decision
should be rested not on the Fifteenth Amendment, but rather on the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution." 5 The decision was limited to racial discrimination in voting
rights cases because it rested upon the fifteenth amendment.1 6 By
using the fourteenth amendment, as advocated by Justic Whittaker,
the Gomillion decision would have been broader in scope.
The Supreme Court appeared to throw the floodgates wide open
with their decision in Baker v. Carr.'7 The Court held that the failure
of the Tennessee legislature to reapportion itself presented a justici-
able question under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' s In one sweeping motion the Court lifted the reappor-
9. 466 F.2d at 844.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 847-48 (dissenting opinion).
12. Id. at 848.
13. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The Court dealt with an act of the Alabama legisla-
ture that redrew the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "to remove from the
city all save four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single
white voter or resident." Id. at 341. The Court concluded that such a blatant
racial gerrymander lifted "this controversy out of the so-called 'political' arena
and into the conventional sphere of Constitutional litigation." Id. at 346-47.
14. Id. at 339, 346.
15. Id. at 349 (concurring opinion).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1: "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
17. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
18. Specifically, the Court stated that: "[A]ppellants' claim that they are
being denied equal protection is justiciable and if 'discrimination is sufficiently
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tionment controversy out of the "political arena" and into the "judi-
cial arena."' 19 The Court indicated that judicially manageable stand-
ards were present and could be found under the equal protection
clause. 20 Over the ensuing years the Court has refined its position and
clarified its standards. In Wesberry v. Sanders2' it held that: "[W]hile
it may not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathemati-
cal precision, that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution's plain
objective of making equal representation for equal numbers the funda-
mental goal ....- 22 This line of clarification was continued in Rey-
nolds v. Sims.23 In that case the Court held that voting districts must
be substantially equal in population 4 in order to prevent dilution of
votes. 25 The decision was based upon the fourteenth amendment. 0
In addition to voting districts being of equal population, they must
be contiguous and compact. 27 These two standards appear to be the
ones that a federal court will look to when judging the validity of a
reapportionment plan. If they are met, the reapportionment is pre-
sumed valid.
The Court apparently made its position on political gerrymander-
ing clear when it affirmed, in a per curiam decision, a district court's
shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause is not diminished by
the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.'" (Citation omitted.)
Id. at 209-10. See Note, The Supreme Court in its Political Milieu, 46 B.U.L.
REv. 375, 383 (1966); 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010 (1962).
19. "We hold that this challenge to an apportionment presents no nonjustici-
able 'political question.'" 369 U.S. at 209.
20. Id. at 226.
21. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
22. Id. at 18.
23. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
24. Id. at 579.
25. "[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise." Id. at 555. See Lucas v. The Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation
v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964). All these cases were reapportionment cases de-
cided the same day as Reynolds.
26. "Diluting the weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic
constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment . . . ." 377 U.S. at 566.
27. Id. at 578-79. This requirement is also decreed by Illinois state law: ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 21-36 (Smith-Hurd 1961). Most states have such a re-
quirement. See Note, Political Gerrymandering: The Law and Politics of Partisan
Districting, 36 Gao. WAsH. L. Rav. 144, 146-49 (1967).
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holding that political gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable political
questionY* Justice Harlan wrote a short concurrence in which he de-
clared: "[I]t [the district court] rejected contentions that apportioning
on a basis of... partisan 'gerrymandering' may be subject to federal
constitutional attack under the Fourteenth Amendment. In affirming
this decision, the Court necessarily affirms ... [this] eminently correct
principle[s].";' The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
consistently adhered to this position.3 0 Thus, if a group is to convert
a nonjusticiable political question into a justiciable constitutional
question, the group must allege some type of gerrymander other than
a political gerrymander. The group must have a common denomina-
tor based on racial, ethnic, or economic background.31
The dissent in Cousins points out that there is ultimately no real
substantive difference between a racial gerrymander and a political
gerrymander. The only reason a political incumbent would want to
dilute the votes of a racial or ethnic group (or any other group) is
because of the political power they could wield if they voted as a
bloc rather than as individuals: "The mere fact that a number of
citizens share a common ethnic, racial, or religious background does
not create the need for protection against gerrymandering. It is only
when their common interests are strong enough to be manifested in
political action that the need arises."32 If any group can establish that
they are likely to vote as a bloc, and that the political "ins" reappor-
tion to either concentrate3 3 or fragment4 that voting bloc, then there
28, WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam,
382 U.S. 4 (1965) (WMCA was a taxpayer's association).
29. 382 U.S. at 6.
30. See Ferrell v. Oklahoma ex rel. Hall, 339 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Okla.),
af 'd, 406 U.S. 939 (1972): "The issue of political gerrymandering ... is non-
justiciable . . . " 339 F. Supp. at 82. Grivetti v. Illinois State Electoral Bd.,
335 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.
Tex. 1966), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120(1967): "This court concludes that plaintiffs' allegation of political gerrymander-
ing does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . ." 252 F. Supp.
at 434; Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 245, 250-51 (D. Kan. 1966). All of these
cases involved an alleged gerrymander based on partisan politics.
31. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Cousins v. City Council,
466 F.2d 830, 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972); Cousins v. City
Council, 322 F. Supp. 428, 436 (N.D. Il1. 1971).
32. 466 F.2d at 852.
33. The black plaintiffs in Cousins were claiming just such a concentration.
The "ghetto" wards that had a black majority were virtually 100% black and
the "fringe" wards that had black voters contained few blacks. Id. at 834.
34. The Puerto Rican plaintiffs in Cousins were alleging that they had been
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is a violation of the fourteenth amendment3' Since the coverage of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 0 is not
limited to violations based upon racial or ethnic background, as is
the fifteenth amendment,3 7 it would be a violation of the fourteenth
amendment to deny independent voters the opportunity to prove that
a reapportionment was intentionally directed to affect their voting
strength. The Supreme Court now reads Gomillion and other racial
discrimination cases as resting on the fourteenth, not the fifteenth
amendment,38 thus strengthening the position of the independent
voters.
The group asserting the constitutional violation should be a dearly
definable group. In the city of Chicago the independent voters are
just such a group.3 9 If the independents, however, are recognized as
a definable group and their allegations are considered justiciable, then
it follows that the Republicans and the Democrats must be allowed
to sue. The Supreme Court has by implication rejected this conten-
tion.40 If the major political parties were allowed to present justici-
able questions, then the judiciary would be further entangled in the
"political thicket." Recent decisions indicate that the Supreme Court
fragmented. Based on the 1970 census they should have had a majority in two
wards, yet the ward lines were drawn in such a manner as to place the Puerto
Rican "ghetto" into three different wards, none of which had a Puerto Rican
majority. Id. at 834.
35. Indeed, this is the reasoning of the majority in Cousins. The evidence
established a probability that this was the purpose of the Democratic majority
in the city when they redrew the ward lines. Id. at 843.
36. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1: "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
38. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23 (1968): "The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
permits the states to make classifications and does not require them to treat
different groups uniformly. Nevertheless, it bans any 'invidious discrimination'
.... That command protects voting rights and political groups ... ." Id. at 39.
39. M. RoYxo, Boss: RicHAno J. DALLY oF CHicAao 13 (1971).
40. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156 (1971).
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is retreating from this area.4 1 Thus it appears that the allegation of
a fourteenth amendment violation in reapportionment by a group
whose only common characteristic is political philosophy, is still
among the nonjusticiable political questions. It is likely to remain so
for the foreseeable future.
Edward C. Richard
41. Witness the Supreme Court's recent retreat from "one man-one vote" in
the reappointment of the Virginia Legislature. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973).
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